ON AXIOMATIZATION OF PLURALITY DECISIONS WITH VETO

Authors

  • Jacek Mercik Wyższa Szkoła Bankowa we Wrocławiu

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.29015/cerem.225

Keywords:

aggregation of preferences, axioms, power indices

Abstract

The article presents an analysis of the axioms associated with the plurality method of aggregation of individual preferences, both when it is necessary to select one of many alternatives and when it is necessary to approve a single alternative. Also, we investigate the impact of the introduction of a new attribute, being the right of veto (absolute and relative), on the axioms given. In the conclusion, the emphasis is that the commonly used method of aggregation, i.e. the plurality method is not, in this sense, the best method.

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Published

2016-10-15